This paper analyzes the relation between the 2008 European financial crisis and firms' cash holding policies from a precautionary motive perspective. After considering how the European financial crisis affected the cash holding policy across different period times, we focus on whether these variations come from changes in precautionary motives. We find a positive effect for the short crisis period and a negative effect for long crisis period for the full sample. We also find evidence that for financially constrained firms, the relation between cash volatility and cash holding is positive for short crisis period but turns negative for the long crisis period.
• In their financial plans, EU policy makers and European banks need to focus on European firms' and investors' precaution (financial uncertainty) levels.
• Regulators should consider that lower uncertainty causes to firms to do less cash holding in a crisis period.
• Financial authorities and financial markets should better consider the design of policies based on financial constraints and precautionary motives.
• Policy makers should design policies that optimize the efficient use of liquid resources both at the banking and firm levels The question concerning which factors affect a firm's cash holding policy is one of the most widely discussed issues in finance literature. Cash levels are strongly related to a firm's hedging policies, which is a key decision for firms, especially in a crisis environment. Prior research shows that firms have four motives for holding cash: a transaction motive; a tax motive; an agency motive; and a precautionary motive (Bates et al., 2009) . The extant literature identifies the precautionary as one of the most important, and recent literature has continued to focus on this motive. For example, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that a high level of cash holdings is related to financial constraints, in that firms hold elevated levels of cash for precautionary reasons. Song and Lee (2012) show that changes in a firm's precautionary motive, rather than changes in firm characteristics, can explain increased cash holdings. In addition, Dur an et al. (2016) discuss the role of the precautionary motive on family firms' cash holding policies, and Duchin et al. (2017) address the precautionary motive in relation to risky assets.
The precautionary motive theory for holding cash predicts that firms hoard internal funds to finance possible future investment projects in order to avoid a possible shortage of external funds and to prevent sales and investment opportunity shocks. However, crisis periods can severely affect firms' precautionary motive. In 2008, the International Monetary Fund highlighted the magnitude of the problem in global financial markets: 'The financial market crisis that erupted in August 2007 has developed into the largest financial shock since the Great Depression, inflicting heavy damage on markets and institutions at the core of the financial system'. 1 This large shock to the financial markets caused huge uncertainty among market actors (Kahle and Stulz, 2013 ) that lasted across many years. In 2012, Europe was still coping with uncertainty problems, and the economic position of some countries, such as Greece or Ireland, was worse than it was at the beginning of the crisis (Stiglitz, 2012) . Stiglitz (2012) finds that in 2012 the financial crisis continued to have negative effects on Europe's financial markets. In turn, this financial uncertainty affected firms' cash holding policies.
The European financial crisis is characterized by an exceptional liquidity crunch (Campello et al., 2011) ; in addition to an aggregate credit supply shortage, credit demand by firms varied greatly. Stiglitz (2012) , Arslan-Ayaydin et al (2014) , and Pinkowitz et al. (2013) find that the European financial crisis is a debt crisis that sparked great uncertainty globally, particularly in the European market. The major crisis had an obvious effect on firms' cash holding policies, especially as regards decisions related to a precautionary motive. That is, the fundamental effects of the crisis, including increased uncertainty for firms' future cash flow expectations, cash flow volatility levels (Kahle and Stulz., 2013) , and uncertain expectations for future investment opportunities, should increase firms' precautionary level (Pinkowitz et al., 2013; Song and Lee, 2012) . Given this economic environment, we examine whether such a crisis causes European firms to increase their accumulation of cash and, if so, whether this change can be explained by a change in firms' precautionary motive. Although prior research intuits such a relation, the issue has not yet been directly addressed in the literature.
Thus, our goal provides guidelines that help to make decisions concerning how the European financial crisis affects firms' cash holding policy by analyzing the relation between a precautionary motive and firms' cash holdings in the financial crisis period. Two main considerations drive our investigation of this relation. First, how the crisis affects firms' cash holding levels in Europe can provide valuable insight for future crises, particularly across time. As such, the definition of the crisis period is very important. Although some studies using US samples extend the crisis period by a number of years, studies using European samples generally focus on the effect of the first years of the crisis. In contrast, we analyze the effects of the crisis using a six-year period to determine whether the effect of the crisis on cash holding levels remains or whether it loses power after the early years of the crisis. Thus, we separate the crisis years into two periods and investigate the effect of the crisis on cash holding in European firms for each period. Second, considering the close relation between the precautionary motive and the financial crisis, we posit that changes in firms' adherence to the precautionary motive can explain the effect of the crisis on cash holding levels.
To determine the effect of a precautionary motive on the relation between the financial crisis and cash holdings, we first examine whether the financial crisis in Europe causes firms to hold more cash. Second, given the extended effects of the crisis on the European financial market, we investigate whether the crisis's effect on firms' cash holding policies retains or loses power after the first years of the crisis. Finally, we examine whether changes in the precautionary motive can explain these cash holding policies across the crisis period.
To this end, we test the effects for two periods: the short crisis period (i.e. the first three crisis years: 2007-09) and the long crisis period (six crisis years: 2007-12). Following Opler et al. (1999) , we then analyze firms' precautionary reaction by examining changes in their cash flow volatility on cash levels, and compare this reaction for the two financial crisis periods. Given that the precautionary motive is one of firms' main motives for holding cash, we also test whether results are consistent with those from prior studies that verify the existence of the precautionary motive in firms. If so, this consistency would provide evidence that our results are, in fact, based on a precautionary motivation. If not, we should consider the influence of other possible factors on the results.
In contrast to previous studies of European firms' cash accumulation behaviors, we find an important differential effect in the crisis period. Specifically, the short financial crisis period has a positive effect on firms' cash holding policies. However, when we extend the crisis years to the long crisis period, this positive effect turns negative, suggesting that European firms recover some of their financial flexibility after suffering the powerful shocks of the early crisis years (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014) . We then determine the differences between the short and long crisis periods. For financially constrained and nondividend-paying firms (as a proxy for financial constraint), the effect of cash flow volatility on firms' cash holding level decreases showing that, in contrast to prior studies (e.g. Campello et al., 2011; Pinkowitz et al., 2013) , the crisis effect on cash holding is not homogeneous. Therefore, separating the crisis period into long and short periods allows us to better analyze the precautionary motive effect on firms' cash holdings.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide guidance for cash holding policies and contribute to the literature on the precautionary motivations of firms and the effects of the crisis on firms in a European framework. Second, given that cash accumulation depends on differing geographical environments and on differing periods of time, we extend prior research by investigating the relation between the European financial crisis and firms' cash holding decision-making for two crisis periods: short (first three crisis years) and long (six crisis years). Third, in addition to examining firms' decision-making related to cash accumulation around the crisis, we determine whether variations in the cash holding decision are related to changes in firms' precautionary motive. We then compare our results with the prior literature on the effect of the precautionary motive on firms' decision-making to determine whether our findings are consistent. Fourth, we examine two unique financially constrained firm types (using the Whited and Wu index and dividend payout) to highlight the importance of the precautionary motive for different financial crisis periods in Europe. We thus provide some initial evidence that European firms' cash holding policies are linked to precautionary motivations during crisis periods. Finally, to test our models, we use panel data methodology to account for individual heterogeneity and to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the previous literature and constructs our hypotheses. The third section provides the data, and the fourth section discusses the methods used to test the hypotheses empirically. The fifth section explains the results and compares them to previous findings. Finally, the sixth section concludes the paper.
Literature and hypotheses
Financial crisis and cash holding: the precautionary motive
The global finance crisis threw economies around the world into uncertainty. The crisis, which started in mid-2007 with a credit boom (e.g. Acharya et al., 2009; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009) , became more visible when subprime mortgages and securitized products problems came to light. The failure of Lehman Brothers and the takeovers of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG formed an appropriate environment to cause a full-blown banking panic in the economies around the world (Ivashina and Scarfstein, 2010) . Furthermore, the crisis in 2008 caused an exceptional liquidity crunch (Campello et al., 2011) because financial crises clearly represent exogenous shocks to firms' viability, profitability, and cash flows and generally reduce the expected return on investment opportunities (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014) . For instance, from the point of the credit supply shock, credit-dependent firms were forced to reduce their capital expenditures, and firms used their cash holdings levels in place of now-unobtainable credit (Kahle and Stulz, 2013) . Also, during crises, a possible demand shock increases the level of uncertainty. This sharp increase in uncertainty causes firms to decrease their capital expenditures (Bloom, 2009) and forces firms to retain a lower optimal level of debt and higher cash holdings (Kahle and Stulz, 2013) . In fact, Song and Lee (2012) show that changes in firms' demand function for cash, particularly as related to the precautionary motive, rather than firm characteristics, causes firms to increase cash holdings.
Since Keynes (1937) , precautionary theory has helped to explain firms' cash holding policies. This theory suggests that when a cash flow shock occur, firms protect themselves by increasing their cash holdings. Firms use cash savings as insurance against the possibility of not having enough funds to pay their contractual obligations (e.g. Acharya et al., 2007; Almeida et al., 2004; Kim et al., 1998) . In these models, the company attempts to maximize the value derived from the investment process under financing friction that arises exogenously. Under a number of scenarios, holding the most liquid asset (cash) insures the firm against external financial constraints (Campello et al., 2011) . Consistent with this theory (Opler et al., 1999) , industry-level cash flow volatility is a key determinant of corporate cash holdings. Moreover, following Fazzari et al. (1988) , who argue that firms care more about cash when financial markets are marked by friction, Almeida et al. (2004) show that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive only for financially constrained firms, whereas financially unconstrained firms show no statistically significant result. Consistently with their findings, Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that the marginal value of cash holdings is greater for financially constrained firms. Acharya et al. (2007) show that when a firm's cash flow levels are low and investment opportunities are high, the insurance role of cash holding is more evident. Bates et a; . (2009) find that the average cash-asset ratio of industrial companies in the United States more than doubled between 1980 and 2006. They argue that companies prefer to hold more cash to cope with uncertainty risks. In addition, Duchin et al. (2010) results are consistent with previous work that finds the smoothing benefits of working capital, including cash (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993) . Furthermore, they provide additional evidence on the precautionary benefits of cash holdings when credit is tight and firms are financially constrained or dependent on external finance.
From the perspective of cash holdings, a clear relation exists between crises and precautionary theory dynamics. As previously mentioned, firms hold more cash via a precautionary motive when adverse shocks hit the market and access to the capital market is costly (Opler et al., 1999) . Firms have more uncertainty related to their future cash flow and their cash flow volatility increases (Han and Qiu, 2007) ; thus, firms hold more cash based on a precautionary motive. Finally, a low correlation between operating income and investment opportunities (Acharya et al., 2007) also motivates firms to hold more cash.
However, Pinkowitz et al. (2013) show that US firms, particularly more profitable firms, hold more cash after the 2008 crisis than firms with similar characteristics in the late 1990s. Growth opportunities support cash holdings, and the precautionary motive loses its power. Bliss et al.'s (2015) findings are also in line with this growth opportunities hypothesis. Furthermore, using US data from 1920 until 2012 from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Graham et al. (2015) show that cash holdings have a positive relation with GDP growth. 2 Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) show that European firms rely more on their conservative leverage policies than their cash holding policies to attain their financial flexibility in crises years. Also, again for the European firms, Campello et al. (2011) find that the credit lines do not completely dry up during the crisis. These results suggest that firms' precautionary level in Europe is lower than in the United States.
Given these possible changes on firms' precautionary level, we analyze the financial crisis for two periods: first, for the short term (first three crisis years) in which we expect an increase in the firms' cash holding levels related to an increase in their precautionary motive and, second, for the long term (six crisis years) in which we expect that growth opportunities and/or GDP growth may mitigate the precautionary motive effect Thus, we state our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The financial crisis across short (long) period positively (negatively) affects firms' cash holding levels in Europe.
Precautionary motive in crisis and cash holding
Given the relation between the crisis and a precautionary motive, we consider the effects on European firms, an area of study yet to be examined. Our main difficulty, as Duchin et al. (2010) indicate, is estimating the optimal level of precautionary savings. To solve this problem, we analyze the financial constrains using two classifications of firms, given their previously identified relation to a precautionary motive, as indicators of the existence of a precaution motive. In the following sub-section, we discuss the unique characteristics of these firms as outlined in the literature relative to a precautionary motivation and how we use them in our analyses. Almeida et al. (2004) first studied the relation between higher cash holdings and financially constrained firms. They show that firms have more cash on hand when they are financially constrained. In other words, in financial markets where firms are uncertain of future cash flows, financially constrained firms increase their cash levels. In contrast, Almeida et al. find no significant change for financially unconstrained firms' cash levels. As previously mentioned, in a crisis atmosphere, firms' uncertainty about future cash flows increases, and, given a very large crisis as occurred in 2007-2008, uncertainty levels can rise substantially. The situation is all the more precautious for firms with financial constraints. Therefore, as the literature clearly indicated, financially constrained firms are good proxies to examine the effect of the precautionary motive on firms' cash holding levels (Almeida et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2009; Han and Qiu, 2007) . Thus, we investigate the effect of the crisis over the short and long periods for financially constrained firms as a specific precautionary occurrence.
On the other hand, nondividend-paying firms are also considered as good proxies for the precautionary motive because they react similarly to financially constrained firms in their cash holding decision-making (Bates et al., 2009) . Many studies consider nondividend-paying firms be to financially constrained (Almeida et al., 2004) . For instance, Jensen's (1986) theory about free cash flow argues that nondividend-paying firms with poor growth opportunities accumulate more cash. As such, in the short (long) financial crisis period, the importance of cash holding should be higher (lower), and nondividend-paying firms should have more (less) cash related to an increasing (decreasing) precautionary motive. Thus, to use for two different types of financial constraints, we state our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The cash flow volatility level of financially constrained firms affects firms' cash level positively (negatively) in the short (long) crisis period.
Data and estimation model
We use several data sets for our empirical tests. We obtain financial and stock data from the Worldscope database. We get the macroeconomic data from EUROSTAT and from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in particular, from their main economic indicators.
The sample includes 15 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Following the previous literature on cash holdings, we exclude from the sample financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and state-controlled firms (SIC codes 9000-9999). We also eliminate firm-year observations with missing values for our variables of interest and observations that are clearly outliers. 3 Finally, we eliminate firms with less than five consecutive years of data because the estimation method used (GMM) requires at least five consecutive years of data to test for the lack of second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel that consists of 1,541 listed firms for the period of 2000-12 (14,731 firm-year observations). For the long crisis period, we use all of these 14,731 observations. However, when we use the short crisis period, our sample declines to 12,473 observations for the period 2000-2009.
Basic model
First we show and explain Opler et al.'s (1999) , 4 which serves as our basic model:
where CH i,t represents cash holdings; CFVOL it is the volatility of the cash flow level; SIZE it is a control variable of the size of firms; Q it is the Tobin's Q of the firm; NWC it is the working capital net of cash; CF it is the cash flow level of a firm; I it is the investment of the firm; and STD it is the short-term debt of the firm in year t. e it is the error term. All variables, with the exception of SIZE it , are scaled using the replacement cost of capital. CFVOL it variable is calculated as FCFVOL it À ICFVOL t , where FCFVOL it is the variance of the cash flow variable for the previous years and ICFVOL t is the industry's cash flow variance in year t. The investment variable is calculated as I it ¼ CAPEXit Kit , where CAPEX it are the capital expenditures and K it is the replacement value of total assets. 5 The variables in the basic model are estimated and described extensively in previous literature. First, we include cash flow volatility to test the effects of precautionary motive on cash holdings. According to trade-off theory, firms that have more volatile cash flow levels are more likely to experience cash shortages in the future; thus, we expect positive or negative relations between cash flow volatility and cash holdings depending on the possible different effects of the crisis periods. Second, the lagged cash holding variable tests for the existence of a target level of cash holding (Opler et al., 1999) . We expect the coefficient to be positive. Third, we include the size variable as a control variable because of standard arguments of economies of scale in cash management and in finance research. Fourth, firms with high investment opportunities hoard higher levels of cash because the costs they incur if their financial condition worsens are higher (Opler et al., 1999) ; therefore, we include the variable Tobin's Q. We also include the variable investment to control for possible investment correlations with Tobin's Q. Nevertheless, we expect a negative relation between investment and cash holdings because firms with higher levels of cash holdings tend to invest more in acquisitions (Harford, 1999 ). Short-time debt and net working capital are our other control variables and act as substitutes for cash; therefore, we expect a negative relation between cash holdings and both variables (Kim et al., 1998) . Our cash flow level variable represents the cash flow sensitivity of cash, as presented by Almeida et al. (2004) and finally we include year and country dummy variables as the literature suggests.
Models for the hypotheses
We develop several models to explore the relation between the crises and firms' cash holding policies and validate our two hypotheses. We examine our hypotheses from two perspectives; first from the effect of short-term and then the long-term crisis. To test Hypothesis 1 for the short and long crisis periods, respectively, we develop the following models:
where SCrisis (LCrisis) is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the observation's year is between 2007 and 2009 (2007-12) , and zero otherwise. b 1 measures the short period crisis effect's on firms' cash holding policies, and x 1 shows the effect of long period crisis. Following our Hypothesis 1, we expect b 1 > 0 and x 1 < 0.
To test the effect of financially constrained (following the Whited and Wu index) firms' precautionary reaction to cash holding policies for the short and long crisis periods, respectively, as in Hypothesis 2, we construct following models:
where FC (NFC) is a dummy variable that is measured using Whited and Wu's (2006) index and equals 1 if the firm is financially constrained (financially unconstrained), and zero otherwise. b 2 (x 2 ) and b 3 (x 3 ) measure the cash flow volatility effects of financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms, respectively, in the short (long) crisis period on firms' cash holding policies. a 2 measures the pure relation between cash flow volatility and cash holding. For the effect of the short crisis period model, we expect (a 2 + b 2 ) > (a 2 ), and conversely, for the long crisis period model, we expect (a 2 + x 2 ) < (a 2 ). In other words, we expect that the effect of the short (long) crisis period to be positive (negative).
Using similar models, we test again Hypothesis 2 on the whether precautionary level of nondividend-paying firms changes in the short and long crisis periods, respectively. Our dividend models are:
where NDIV (DIV) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firms are nondividend-paying (dividend-paying), and zero otherwise. Our models give more importance to the results of nondividend-paying firms than do those of Bates et al.
(2009) because we want to show the similarities between these type of firms and financially constrained firms. Similar to the previous models, in the short (long) crisis period model, b 4 (x 4 ) and b 5 (x 5 ) measure the cash flow volatility effects of nondividend-paying firms and dividend-paying firms, respectively, in the short (long) crisis period on firms' cash holding policies. For the effect of short and long crisis periods, we expect (a 2 + b 4 ) > (a 2 ) and (a 2 + x 4 ) < (a 2 ), respectively. We estimate the models using panel data methodology, 6 which has two main advantages. First, we address the endogeneity problem that arises in our analysis by using the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the model of Almeida et al. (2004) . Second, this methodology controls for the individual effect of unobserved heterogeneity to avoid biased results. Once we estimate the model, we conduct several specification tests. First, we run the Hansen contrast, which tests the lack of correlation between the instruments and random disturbance. Second, we run the m 2 test which tests the lack of second-order serial correlation of the first differenced residuals. Finally, we run three Wald tests to check for the joint significance of reported coefficients, temporal variables, and country variables. Panels C and D in Table 2 provide some univariate tests. Panel C provides differences of means tests that compare financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms for three different periods. These two types of companies differ in cash holdings for all periods. For all periods, financially constrained firms' cash holding level is higher than that of financially unconstrained firms. This difference is lower for the long crisis period than for the other two periods. Also, the difference in the cash flow volatility level between the short and long crisis periods is substantial for financially constrained firms. Panel D shows the differences of means tests for nondividend-paying and dividend-paying firms. In all periods, nondividend-paying firms have higher cash holding levels than dividend-paying firms. And, similar to our findings for financially constrained firms, the difference in cash flow volatility level for nondividend-paying firms is striking. The European Financial Crisis and Firms' Cash Holding Policy Table 3 shows the descriptive variables for three periods; pre-crisis, short crisis, and long crisis. Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) , among others, mark 2007 as the starting point of the crisis; consequently, we define the pre-crisis period as 2000-06. We then define the short crisis period as 20-2009 and the long crisis period as 2007-12. Although our focus is on the crisis periods, we show the results for the pre-crisis period to illustrate and examine the changes in the different variables as the crisis occurs and note the differences between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 7 Cash holding levels show clear differences between the short and long crisis periods: in the short crisis period, average cash À0.149*** 1 Q 0.272*** À0.071*** 1 CFVOL 0.073*** À0.085*** 0.042*** 1 CF À0.027*** 0.190*** 0.161*** À0.219*** 1 I À0.114*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.038*** 0.126*** 1 NWC À0.096*** À0.229** À0.002 À0.049*** 0.101*** À0.113*** 1 STD À0.308*** À0.007 À0.335*** À0.023*** À0.152*** À0.054*** À0.123*** holdings are quite similar to the those in the pre-crisis period; however, in the crisis (long) period, average cash holdings decrease noticeably. Another notable change occurs for the firms' cash flow volatility levels: In the short crisis period, the level of cash flow volatility is similar to that of the long crisis period; however, in the pre-crisis period, this level changes substantially.
Results

Summary statistics and descriptive analysis
Regression results
Model 1 (model 2) of Table 4 shows the overall effects of the crisis on the whole European sample for the short (long) crisis period. Specifically, the short crisis period has a positive effect on firms' cash holdings (b 1 = 0.005, p < 0.001), and the long crisis period has a negative effect on firms' cash holding decision (x 1 = À0.010, p < 0.001). These results support Hypothesis 1 that the crisis affects firms' cash holding policies but that the length of the crisis is important in this relation. In other words, whereas the crisis positively affects cash holdings in the short term, this effect turns negative in the longer term. In line with prior literature, we suppose that this difference is related to firms' precautionary motive; firms' precautionary level relates both to the desire for cash and the level of uncertainty they face (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009 ). Based on these results, we next extend our research to specific firm types to determine whether European firms' precautionary motives affect their cash holding policies differently in the short and long crisis periods. Model 3 (model 4) of Table 4 shows the results for the relation between cash flow volatility and cash holdings for financially constrained and unconstrained firms for the short (long) crisis periods. For the short crisis period, the effect of cash flow volatility for financially constrained firms is higher (a 2 + b 2 = 0.074 + 0.022 = 0.096, p < 0.001) than it is for financially unconstrained firms (a 2 = 0.074, p < 0.001). This results change for the long crisis period: the effect of cash flow volatility for financially constrained firms is lower (a 2 + x 2 = 0.070 À 0.071 = À0.001, p < 0.001) than it is for financially unconstrained firms (a 2 = 0.070, p < 0.001). In other words, the short and long crisis periods have differing effects on financially constrained and unconstrained firms' cash holding policies due to the heightened precautionary motives of financially constrained firms. Thus, these findings support Hypothesis 2 and confirm Almeida et al.'s (2004) and Han and Qiu's (2007) assertion that the relation between cash holding and cash flow volatility in financially constrained firms is a good proxy for firms' level of precaution.
Model 5 (model 6) of Panel B in Table 4 examines the relation between cash flow volatility and cash holdings for nondividend-paying and dividend-paying firms for the short (long) crisis period. The effect of cash flow volatility for nondividend-paying firms is higher (a 2 + b 4 = 0.073 + 0.059 = 0.132, p < 0.001) in the short crisis period than it is for dividend-paying firms (a 2 = 0.073, p < 0.001). In the long crisis period, the effect of cash flow volatility for nondividend paying firms decreases (a 2 + x 4 = 0.070 À 0.059 = 0.011, p < 0.001) whereas it remains consistent for dividend-paying firms (a 2 = 0.070, p < 0.001). These results confirm that firms' precautionary motives differ for the short and long crisis periods and that these differences directly affect firms' cash holding policies (Almeida et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2009) .
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effect of the financial crisis on firms' cash holding policies given the lack of research focusing on this geographical frame (Europe) and given the length of the crisis. We thus investigate whether cash holding policies are related to firms' precautionary motive. This study is the first to divide the effects into unique crisis periods to consider firms' precautionary motives.
We analyze two types of firms for which prior literature has identified particular precautionary motive reactions: financially constrained versus financially unconstrained using two proxies -the Whited and Wu index and dividend policy. We study whether the relation between firms' uncertainty level and cash holdings is similar or dissimilar for the two crisis periods.
Our findings provide several insights that are relevant visa-vis helping the cash holding policies of European firms for different crisis periods. In particular, a positive effect exists in the short crisis period for firms' cash holding levels; that is, during the first years of the crisis, European firms do not reduce their cash holding levels. However, the positive effect of the crisis on cash holding policies turns negative (decreases) for financially constrained European firms for the long crisis period, probably due to the easing of the crisis and decreasing financial difficulties. These findings show that the crisis affects firms' cash holding policies. Moreover, the length of the crisis period is important to this relation. The different precautionary motive levelsas one of the principal cash holding motivesaffect firms' cash holding policies differently, which are, in turn, related to decreasing uncertainty in the financial environment over the longer crisis period. Prior literature shows that the relation between firms' cash flow volatility and cash is a good proxy for firms' precautionary motive levels. Thus, the varying response of financially constrained firms to cash holdings, from positive in the short crisis period to negative in the long crisis period, is likely related to their motivation to act with precaution. We find a similar relation between cash flow volatility and the À0.009*** À5.55 NDIV 0.109*** 6.08 0.012*** 8.52 CFVOL 0.073*** 9.63 0.070*** 13.05 NDIV * CFVOL * crisis 0.059*** 6.52 À0.059*** À8.74 DIV * CFVOL * crisis À0.066 À7.06 0.070*** 9.66 F * CFVOL * crisis NF * CFVOL * crisis CF 0.018*** 5.92 0.017*** 6.62 Q 0.008*** 6.52 0.012*** 14.87 SIZE À0.002*** À1.81 À0.001*** À1.51 I À0.183*** À11.16 À0.187*** À15.22 NWC À0.141*** À15.74 À0.123*** À28.52 STD À0.118*** À15.65 À0.110*** À21.80 N 11,779 13,181 z 1 810.07 (8) 2530.80 (8) Notes: The models are estimated using the GMM estimator. The dependent variable is cash holdings. z x are the Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, the time dummies and the country dummies respectively. m i is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences and Hansen is a test of the overidentifying restrictions. Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. cash holding relation for nondividend-paying-firms. These two types of financially constrained firms react similarly since they are both highly dependent on their cash levels (financially constrained and nondividend-paying firms). As the literature finds that certain firm types hold cash based on a precautionary motive, we infer that the precautionary motive is a relevant explanation for these firms' behavior and we highlight the relation between the length of the crisis period and the power of firms' precautionary motive.
In sum, we provide some patterns for the relevance of studying the close relation between the financial crisis and firms' cash holding decision for European firms. For the first time in the literature, we show that firms' cash holding policies are not homogeneous for different periods of the 2008 European financial crisis. We determine the unique effects of firms' precautionary motive on cash holdings for the short and long crisis periods. Financially constrained firms show relevant changes on the precautionary motive between periods. In other words, these firms reduce their cash holding levels over the longer period due to decreasing uncertainty in the years subsequent to the early major years of the crisis. Consequently, European firms' cash holding policies in both the short and long crisis periods may be related to changing uncertainty levels and thus to firms' precautionary motives.
This paper provides guidelines for firms, governments, and stakeholders by outlining the relevance of the precautionary motive, especially with regard to firms' financial decisions related to cash holding. A firm's investment and dividend policies are strongly related with its cash holding decisions. Our findings can provide guidance to firms, allowing them to make better decisions on their cash holdings policy, especially in periods of shortage of external funds, such as in a financial crisis. Future research should examine whether this change in precautionary motive is specific to the 2008 financial crisis due to its extended length and the severity of this crisis or whether firms react similarly during other crisis periods. This question is important, particularly for financially constrained firms, since history tells us that this crisis will not be the last, and that firms will benefit from understanding a safe position for their cash levels.
